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Summary findings
"Never  take a sleeping  pill and a  the 1980s,  the crisis  of the heavily  indebted  poor
laxative  on the same  night."  countries (HIPCs)  in the 1980s and 1990s,  and the
-Saying passed along  by author's Aunt Marilyn  increased  public  debt burden of the industrial  countries
in the 1980s and 1990s.
The worldwide  slowdown  in growth after 1975 was a  Moreover, the HIPCs' debt problems  were worse than
major  negative  fiscal  shock.  Slower  growth lowers  the  elsewhere  because,  as a result of poor policies,  these
present  value  of tax revenues  and primary  surpluses  and  countries grew  more slowly  after 1975  than other low-
thus makes  a given level  of debt more  burdensome.  Most  income countries.
countries  failed  to adjust  to the negative  fiscal  Econometric  tests  and fiscal  solvency  accounting
consequences  of the growth implosion,  so public-  confirm  the important  role of growth in debt crises.
debt-to-GDP  ratios exploded.
The growth slowdown  therefore  played an important
role in the debt crisis  of the middle-income  countries  in
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It is well known that GDP growth has slowed down in recent decades for virtually
all countries. 2 The unweighted  cross-country world average of GDP growth slowed from
about 5 percent in the quarter-century  before 1975 to about 3 percent in the quarter
century since 1975 (Figure 1).3
Figure  1: The Unweighted  World
Average  GDP Growth Rate
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T'his  paper examines a consequence  of the growth implosion that has not attracted
much attention  - its effect on public finances. Since taxes rise one for one with output
(Easterly, Serven, and Calderon 2000), slower growth reduces the present value of the
stream of future taxes. This makes a given level of public debt more difficult to service.
Moreover, if public deficits are not changed to adjust to the growth slowdown, the debt to
GDP ratio will rise.
2 See Ben-David and Papell 1998  for a formal econometric treatment.
31 used 1  00 for the smoothing  parameter for the HP filter. A test of the equality of means for growth 50-75
and growth 75-99 for the 131  countries  with data shows a statistically  significant downward shift of 1.93
percentage points.3
Indeed, the growth implosion had as a counterpart  a debt explosion. The
worldwide average public debt to GDP ratio rose steeply in the 70s and 80s, before
leveling off in the 1990s (Figure 2).
Figure  2:  Workhdide  aveage  public  debt  to  GDP  ratio
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This paper will argue that the slowdown in growth had an important role in the
development of debt problems  in the highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs), in the
highly indebted middle income countries, and in the industrial countries. A fall in growth
could explain why debt levels that were sustainable  under a previous growth regime
became unsustainable and triggered a crisis under a new growth regime. I will test this
hypothesis below with some accounting  for changes in debt ratios attributable  to growth
and those attributable  to deficits. I will also test econometrically  the number of debt
reschedulings as a function of the interaction between initial debt levels and growth. The
paper does not suggest that the growth slowdown is a monocausal explanation of debt
crises, but it did play an important  role.4
The paper does not attempt to explain the growth slowdown, implicitly  taking it
as exogenous. This does not seem unreasonable when we are dealing with a global
phenomenon that affected practically all countries. The growth slowdown is essentially
one worldwide observation, which could have any number of explanations (slower
technological  progress, slower population growth, etc.).
However, the growth slowdown was more severe in some countries than in others,
and those countries were the ones with the most rapid growth in debt to GDP ratios
(Figure 3). The coefficient of a regression of the log change in Public Debt/GDP 1975-
94 on the change in the growth rate 1960-75 to 1975-94  is insignificantly different than
negative one, implying there was no adjustment  of the pace of borrowing to the
slowdown  in growth. In effect, countries were calibrating their borrowing over 1975-94
to the old growth rate 1960-75,  not to the new growth  rate 1975-94.  Hence, the degree of
the growth slowdown had a strong effect on the rise in public debt ratios. The paper will
examine  some of the determinants  (including fiscal variables) of the cross-section
variation  in degree of growth slowdown.5
Figure  3: Change  In growth  and
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It will follow that policy variables that make some countries slow down less or
more than others do have fiscal consequences.  The emphasis in adjustment  programs in
response to debt crises is usually on correcting macroeconomic  imbalances, such as
budget deficits, or in granting debt relief that alleviates the amount of adjustment needed.
However, growth plays an important  role in determining  how much adjustment  or relief
is needed in order to comply with the government's intertemporal  budget constraint. A
permanent fall in growth is an adverse fiscal shock that has to be offset by other fiscal or
relief measures  just like any other fiscal shock like a permanent  drop in export prices of
the state petroleum monopoly,  for example. Conversely,  faster growth makes it easier to
service the initial stock of public debt and requires less of a non-interest budgetary6
surplus - or less debt relief -- to attain solvency.  This suggests that it is important  to
design policy incentives for faster growth as part of any adjustment  package.
The role of growth in the intertemporal  budget constraint has long been known
(Buiter 1990, Buiter and Patel 1992, 1997,  Fischer and Easterly 1990),  but fiscal
adjustment  packages are seldom  designed taking growth slowdowns  into account or
evaluating the fiscal consequences  of policy-induced  changes in growth. This may be
because the work on the intertemporal  budget constraint was done before the advent of
the endogenous growth literature. The voluminous  empirical literature of the past decade
on the determinants  of growth suggests many policy measures that can raise growth as
part of a fiscal adjustment  package:  correction of overvalued exchange rates, fostering
financial development,  improving infrastructure,  and so on.
By the same token, it is very important to design fiscal adjustment  or debt relief
programs so that they don't LOWER the economy's growth rate. For example, if fiscal
adjustment  is achieved  by cutting essential infrastructure  spending, this would lower
growth. Such a package could perversely take the government further away from
solvency, since the present value of the public sector surplus with a lower growth rate
could fall more than it is increased by the direct effect of cutting infrastructure  spending. 4
1.  The intertemporal  budget constraint
Many authors have identified the government's intertemporal  budget constraint as the
ultimate constraint on the government's fiscal activities (see for example Buiter 1985,
Buiter and Patel 1997, Anand and Van Wijnbergen 1988, Blanchard et al. 1990,
Auerbach 1997).
4 Alesina  and  Ardagna  1998  and  Alesina,  Perotti,  and  Tavares  1998  stress  that  fiscal  adjustments  that  cut
government  consumption  expenditure  are  more  expansionary  than  other  fiscal  adjustments.7
(1) f e-r(Tt  +S,  +A, -G,I  O2 Do
0
where
Tj=Tax  revenue at time t
Sj=Seignorage  revenue at time t
At=Aid  receipts at time t (including the grant-equivalent  component of concessional
financing which is given by nominal amount of new concessional loans minus the present
value of their debt service evaluated at discount  rate r)
Gt=Govemment  spending at time t
Do=  Public debt at time zero
r= discount  rate
The intertemporal  budget  constraint says that the present value of the
government's non-interest surpluses  (also known as primary surpluses)  over time must be
equal to or greater than the initial public debt stock. Intuitively, the government is only
solvent if it runs a surplus large enough to cover not only the interest on the debt but also
some payment towards the principal of the debt as well.
If we think of a long run steady state where all these revenues and expenditures
forn a constant ratio to GDP, then it is easy to get a closed form solution for the required
non-interest surplus to satisfy the intertemporal  budget constraint. To illustrate consider
the case where taxes relative to GDP are at their steady state value in time zero. In the
future, tax revenues will grow at the rate of GDP growth g. Then the present value of
taxes is8
(2) PVT = Je-tToeg'dt  - je(r~)tTodt =
0  0  ~~~r-g
Or we can put things in terms of ratios to GDP as follows:
PVT =To  /YOl=  T
(3)  PVT-
YO  r-g  r-g
where X is the steady state ratio of taxes to GDP. This present value is only finite if r>g,
which is the usual condition. 5 An increase in growth will raise the present value of future
taxes. Budget planners in the US are familiar enough with this result as to rely on
optimistic growth projections to make future budgets balance. Surprisingly enough,
however, there is little talk of the role of growth when designing fiscal adjustment
packages in developing nations.
Siimilarly  define the steady state primary surplus to GDP ratio as ac=T/Y+  A/Y +
S/Y-GNY.  We assume the economy is in steady state at time zero. 6 Then the steady state
condition for the intertemporal  budget constraint  to be satisfied is:
(4)  ff_  Do
(4r-g  Y0
5  Otherwise  the  economy  is  dynamically  inefficient.  In  any  case,  the  solvency  constraint  does  not  apply  if
r<g.
6 Easterly, Serven, and Calderon 2000 also find that government  expenditures are cointegrated with GDP,
with a coefficient  of unity.9
This is a familiar condition for the primary surplus from the fiscal solvency literature
(Blanchard et al. 1990, Buiter 1990,  Buiter and Patel 1997, Cuddington 1997).
It also is a condition for stabilizing the debt to GDP ratio. The primary surplus
(including seignorage)  that keeps the debt to GDP ratio stable is a from equation (4). To
derive it another way, write down the equation for the change in the debt to GDP ratio
D  T,+  A, -G  D
(5)A&  - =  S++rg*
Setting the change in the debt to GDP ratio to zero, we get equation (4) for the
sustainable  primary surplus a.  The government is solvent if it is able to run a primary
surplus that keeps the current debt to GDP ratio constant.
We can define the intertemporal  fiscal balance at time t (IFBt) as the difference
between the actual primary surplus (preferably  cyclically adjusted or purged of temporary
fluctuations  with time series techniques) and the primary surplus from (4) that ensures
solvency (Blanchard et al. 1990  have a similar expression for the tax rate, Buiter and
Patel 1997  have an analogous  expression that they call the "primary  gap", Auerbach 1997
and Auerbach and Gale 2000 call it the "fiscal gap").
IFB,  T, +  S, + A, - G,  T, +  S, +  A, - G,  D,
=-  -0=  .-(r-g)-
Y,  Y,  Y,  Yt
(6)
7 A tricky issue is whether the current level of public debt is optimal from some long-run public finance
point of view. Calder6n, Loayza, and Serven.2000  point out that a flaw in the analogous  solvency condition
for the current account of the balance of payments is that the external debt at any one point in time is not
necessarily the desired debt from a portfolio allocation perspective.10
We can see that in addition to the usual focus on the current primary balance and the debt
ratio, growth plays an important  role in whether there is a intertemporal  fiscal imbalance.
Although the role of growth in debt sustainability  is well known, not much attention  has
been paid to the fiscal impact of changes in growth on solvency.
If debt servicing problems develop because of insolvent public sectors, then good
predictors of debt servicing  problems will be D/Y (because of the constant r for all
countries times the debt ratio) and g interacted with D/Y (g*D/Y).  Any adverse shock to
economic  growth will be a fiscal shock, increasing the distance of the current public
stance from solvency. Conversely,  anything that increases growth makes a given primary
surplus more likely to achieve solvency.
The stock equivalent  of (7), assuming again that the current ratio of primary
surplus  to GDP will continue indefinitely, is:
(7)W,  T + St +A,  G,  /rg)_  D,
The "government  net worth" Wt is the difference  between the present value of the
future primary surpluses as a ratio to GDP, if the ratio of primary surplus to GDP remains
fixed indefinitely, and the current debt level. If it is negative, the government  is insolvent
at the current growth rate, fiscal policies, and debt levels. The insolvency will have to be
resolved through some combination  of higher growth, fiscal adjustment,  and/or debt
relief.11
Extensions (that I will not pursue in this paper except in passing) could include
defining D to include contingent liabilities  like the net present value of the social security
system and to net out public assets like oil reserves.
2. Applications of the framework
Let's now discuss several applications  of the effect of growth on public sector
solvency.
Application I: Growth,  policies, and debt crises
What is the combination  of fiscal deficits and poor growth that made highly
indebted countries become highly indebted?  Table 1 shows data on 5 groups of
economies:  the highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs),  the not highly indebted poor
countries, the highly indebted middle income countries, the not highly indebted middle
income countries, and the industrial countries. The classification of a country as "highly
indebted" is from the World Bank's Global Development Finance and refers to the end of
the period. 8 We show data on their debt in 1975 and 1994.  The data on the present value
of publicly guaranteed  external debt obligations  is constructed for this paper from the
World Bank's Global Development Finance database  for low income countries. For
middle income countries the public external debt data for 1975-94  is taken from Loayza
et al 1998. (The reason for the different sources is that low income countries have access
to concessional  official lending, and so the present value of debt obligations is a better
measure of debt burden than the face value of the debt. Middle income countries are
8For middle  income  countries,  highly  indebted  includes  "severely  indebted"  and "moderately  indebted".
For low  income  countries,  highly  indebted  includes  only  the "severely  indebted".  This  difference  in
classification  is because  there  are many  more  severely  indebted  poor  countries,  so I need  this breakdown  to
have  a decent  size  not-highly  indebted  control  group.12
presumed to borrow at market interest rates.) To exclude exchange rate valuation effects,
I evaluate the 1975 foreign debt at the 1994 real exchange rate for each country.
I also have data on public domestic debt for 1975-94 from Loayza et al. 1998
(unfortunately  I don't have data on the terms of domestic debt, so these are taken at face
value). All debt stocks are net of government financial assets like international  reserves
for net foreign debt and government  deposits for net domestic debt.
From the debt ratios in 1975 and 1994 and the GDP growth rate, we can calculate
the implied primary fiscal deficit from (5).9 Table 1 shows the results. One group of
economies that got into high public debt problems  because of slow growth were the
industrial economies, whose growth was significantly  below that of developing  countries
that were not highly indebted (Table 1). Their primary deficit was lower than that of the
developing  non-highly-indebted  countries, but their slow growth compared to those
countries yielded much higher debt ratios. One obvious explanation  for the lower GDP
growth of industrial countries was their much lower rate of population growth (0.6
percent per annum over 1975-94,  compared to 2.6 percent in low income countries).' 0
Rapid population growth may be good or bad from other welfare points of view, but it
does help to service the public debt!
For the middle income countries, the highly indebted ones had the same growth
rates but slightly higher primary deficits than other middle income countries. This was
costly because the highly indebted middle income countries already had higher public
9 Evaluated at the geometric average of the end of period  and beginning of period debt to GDP ratios,
which is a good approximation  to the solution iteratively  solving year by year for the primary  deficit that
would yield the1994 debt ratio as the endpoint,  starting with the 1975 debt ratio.
10  This assumes that population  growth does not just lower per capita growth one for one, leaving aggregate
growth unchanged.  Most cross-country  regressions  in the literature have either a small negative effect  of
population  growth on per capita growth, none at all, or argue that it is not robust (Kelley and Schmidt 1994,
Kling and Pritchett 1994,  Pritchett 1996).13
debt to GDP ratios in 1975 than other middle income countries (which was going to make
them more vulnerable to the decline in growth after 1975 - see below). We don't have
information  on public debt prior to 1975, so we don't know what was the decomposition
of the highly indebted countries' debt ratio evolution prior to 1975 between growth and
primary deficits. We do know that the highly indebted middle income countries already
had 1.2 percentage point lower growth than other middle income countries in 1960-75,
although this difference is not statistically  significant.  The development of the debt crisis
in some middle income countries,  compared to the lack of debt crisis in other middle
income countries, was some combination  of higher initial debt to GDP (reflecting some
combination of higher borrowing and lower growth before 1975) and slightly higher
primary deficits. Because of the higher initial debt, the primary balance should have been
better in the highly indebted countries than the primary balance in other middle income
countries to attain solvency.14
1975  1994
Table 1:  Net  Net  Total net  Net  Net  Total  GDP  Implied  Obser-  Obser-
The  domestic  foreign  public  domestic foreign  net Growth rate  primary  vations  vations
evolution  debt  debt  debt  debt  debt public  75-94  deficit/ on debt  on
of public  debt  GDP,  growth
debt  1975-94


















Industrial  32%  -3%  29%  54%  5%  59%  2.4% **  0.06%  21-22  23
countries
*HIPC growth significantly  less than non-HIPC poor country growth
**Industrial  country growth significantly  less than Not Highly Indebted  poor or middle income countries
World real interest rate is calculated  at 6% for 1978-94  (LIBOR-Dollar  Inflation)
For the poor countries, what is interesting is that the HIPCs became HIPCs NOT
because  of higher primary deficits. They actually ran a primary surplus over  1975-94
(shown as a negative deficit), while the non-HIPC poor countries were running a small
primary  deficit.  The glaring difference between HIPC and non-HIPC  poor countries was15
in their growth rate -- the non-HIPCs grew twice as fast as the HIPCs over 1975-94, a
difference  that is statistically  significant.
The effect of growth on public net worth to GDP is as follows:
awly'  l
(9)  aag  -(rg) 2
(Defining  the left-hand term as e, cat  as m, and c=l/(r-g), we would then have e=mc 2.)
Evaluating this derivative at the point of zero government net worth, we can substitute  in
for at with the a that maintains  solvency from (4). The effect of growth on net worth
evaluated at zero net worth thus depends on the debt ratio:
aWIY  D/Y
0  ag  (r  - g)
The intuition  here is that growth effects on net worth are larger, the higher is your initial
debt, because higher debt forces you to run a higher primary surplus to service it. The
present value of running such a primary surplus  as a fixed ratio to GDP indefinitely is
higher the higher is the growth rate, hence the high effect of growth on net worth in
highly indebted countries. A corollary is that an additional  percentage point of growth
reduces the amount of fiscal adjustment  needed for solvency  more in a high debt country
than in a low debt country.
So why did the HIPCs have slower growth? Although I am taking the worldwide
cross-time  decline in growth as exogenous, we know from the empirical growth literature
that we can to some extent explain cross-country  growth differences. Moreover, some
fiscal policy variables themselves may have growth consequences,  and thus an impact on
the intertemporal  fiscal balance besides their direct effect.16
One example is infrastructure  spending. A large literature (set off by Aschauer
1989) has argued for large effects on growth of infrastructure  spending. These findings
have been challenged by other studies (Holtz-Eakin  1994). However, the micro level
evidence supports the ideas of large effects on economic activity of infrastructure
(Reinikka and Svensson 1999). Calculations  of project rates of returns also find high
returns for infrastructure spending and operations and maintenance  that also improves
infrastructure  service delivery. Physical indicators of infrastructure  like paved roads,
electricity  generation, and telephone density per worker have also been found to have a
strong effect on subsequent growth (Easterly and Levine 1997, Canning 1999, Canning
and Bennathan 2000). Public investment  in transport and communication  has been found
to have a strong effect on growth (Easterly and Rebelo 1993).  This is not to say that all
government investment  is productive, as Pritchett 2000 makes very clear. However,
transport and communications spending seems to be one government activity that is
somewhat  less subject to the "white  elephants" problem. Thus, one could get perverse
intertemporal  effects by cutting deficits with cuts in infrastructure  spending.
However another example of a fiscal policy variable with growth effects is the
simple ratio of government  balances to GDP, which themselves have been found to have
a direct effect on economic growth (Fischer 1993, Easterly and Rebelo 1993, Easterly,
Schmidt-Hebbel  and Rodriguez 1994).  Thus one gets the pleasant fiscal arithmetic  that
reducing budget deficits improves  the intertemporal  fiscal balance both by directly
lowering the deficit and by increasing growth.
I replicate the Easterly and Rebelo 1993 results here with more recent data, using
a panel of decade averages for the 1970s, 1980s,  and 1990s (they used decade averages17
for the 70s and 80s). Table 2 shows the results on the transport and communication
spending and budget balances with the same controls (to the extent possible) that Easterly
and Rebelo 1993 used.' 1 I still find that public spending on transport and
communications  has a significant  effect on growth, as does the government's budget
balance. The effect of infrastructure  spending is 2 to 3 times larger than the growth effect
of the budget balance. Therefore, a reduction in the budget deficit implemented  entirely
by reducing infrastructure  would have a negative  effect on growth, worsening the
government's intertemporal  fiscal position compared to a budget deficit reduction
package that did not decrease  infrastructure  spending. Cuts in infrastructure  spending
could actually provoke the public debt crisis they are meant to avoid.  In Zambia, cuts in
transport and communications  spending of 1.8 percentage points from the 70s to the 90s
decreased public net worth by 9.4 percentage points of GDP.1 2
11  1 use the IMF's  Government  Finance  Statistics  data  on government  spending  on  transportation  and
communications  instead  of the consolidated  public  sector  investment  in transport  and communications  that
Easterly  and  Rebelo  used,  because  the latter  has  not been  updated.  Likewise  I omit  Easterly  and  Rebelo's
controls  of war,  revolutions,  and  coups,  because  these  data  have  not  been  updated  for  the 90s.  I use  the
same  primary  enrollment,  secondary  enrollment,  and  financial  depth  variables  that  Easterly  and  Rebelo
used,  updated  through  the 1990s.  Finally  I use  real  exchange  rate  overvaluation  to measure  trade  openness
because  that  has been  found  to be a more  robust  variable  than  export  share  (Dollar  1992,  Easterly  2000b).
12Evaluated  at the 1994  public  debt  to GDP  ratio  and  the 1975-94  growth  rate.18
Table 2: Replication  of Easterly and Rebelo 1993 Growth Regressions  for Fiscal Variables  and
Other Controls
Dependent  Variable:  Per  Capita  Growth
Estimation  Method:  Seemingly  Unrelated  Regression
Pooled  sample  of 70s, 80s,  90s
Regression  1  Regression  2  Regression  3
Variable  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient t-Statistic
Constant  0.01274  4.62  0.02253  0.90  0.04211  1.60
Public  Spending  on  0.00338  3.47  0.00226  2.05  0.00255  2.01
Transport  and
Communication/GDP
Government  0.00132  4.20  0.00139  4.45  0.00139  3.41
Surplus/GDP
Initial  Income  -0.00493  -1.32  -0.00850  -2.20
Primary  enrollment  0.00025  2.56  0.00023  2.24
Secondary  Enrollment  0.00016  1.36  0.00019  1.46
M2/GDP  0.00026  2.38
Real  Overvaluation  -0.01187  -2.55
R-Squared Observations  R-Squared  Observations  R-Squared Obser-
vations
70s  -0.073  56  -0.129  53  -0.250  46
80s  0.034  73  0.118  66  0.211  58
90s  0.152  56  0.195  47  0.319  41
Does this regression explain why the HIPCs had lower growth over 1975-94  than
other low income countries? I first examine  one possible explanation -- the low growth
could be a consequence  of high debt rather than the other way around. However, I
dismiss this possibility because initial debt to GDP ratios are completely insignificant  as
determinants  of growth when added to regression 3.
Policy differences are a more promising explanation of HIPCs' lower growth. 13
Table 3 shows the differences between HIPC and non-HIPC right-hand-side variables.
HIPCs in the 1980s and 1990s  spent about 2 percentage  points of GDP less on transport19
and communications  than other low income countries, as in the Zambia example earlier.
The lower infrastructure spending in HIPCs had a negative net worth effect of 10-15
percentage points of GDP. If the lower infrastructure  spending was a consequence of
fiscal austerity in HIPCs, this kind of fiscal austerity had a perverse effect on government
net worth compared to fiscal austerity packages that protect infrastructure  spending.
They had more overvalued currencies in the 80s and 90s than other low income
countries. By the 1990s,  they had lower primary and secondary  enrollments and lower
M2/GDP (an indicator of financial development  that has been argued to causally affect
growth, as in Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000). These policy differences explain a
substantial share of the growth differences  between HIPCs and other low income
countries (virtually all of it, by the 1990s).  Moreover, the net worth effect of these
explained  growth differences are substantial -- by the 90s, the effect of the explained
lower growth on public net worth was -49 percent of GDP. That is, if we take these
policy effects as causal, if HIPC policies in the 90s had been at the level of other low
income countries, growth would have also been at the higher level of the other low
income countries. This in turn would have substantially  improved net worth -- by an
amount sufficient to practically  virtually wipe out the higher public debt of HIPCs
compared to other low income countries.
13 Easterly  2000a  documented  that  HIPCs  had  worse  policies  on a wide  range  of dimensions  than  other
developing  countries.20
Table 3: Differentials  in policy variables  HIPCs vs. non-HIPC low income countries
Policy differentials  (t-stats below)  Growth  effect  Net worth effect











-0.330  -2.137  -2.328
Government  -0.856  3.457  -1.428  0.00139  -0.1%  0.5%  -0.2%  -1.8%  12.6%  -5.4%
Surplus
/GDP
-0.502  1.237  -0.713
Initial  0.054  -0.231  -0.313  -0.00850  0.0%  0.2%  0.3%  -0.7%  5.2%  7.3%
Income
0.347  -1.675  -2.203
Primary  -5.024  -14.818  -19.270  0.00023  -0.1%  -0.3%  -0.5%  -1.8%  -9.2%  -12.4%
enrollment
-0.550  -1.562  -2.503
Secondary  -5.012  -7.745  -11.158  0.00019  -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.2%  -1.4%  -3.8%  -5.8%
Enrollment
-1.282  -1.649  -2.381
M2/GDP  -3.299  -6.167  -12.292  0.00026  -0.1%  -0.2%  -0.3%  -1.3%  -4.2%  -8.6%
-1.324  -1.626  -3.043
Real Over-  0.209  0.409  0.387  -0.01187  -0.2%  -0.5%  -0.5%  -3.8%  -12.8% -12.6%
valuation
2.013  3.281  1.944
Total explained growth or net worth differential  -0.8%  -1.0%  -1.8%  -11.8% -26.9%  -49.0%
Actual growth or public debt differential  -1.7%  -2.8%  -1.9%  14.33  69.34  57.36
(t-statistic)  -2.30  -4.61  -1.80  1.22  2.13  1.9421
These policy variables can help explain the differences across countries in the
degree of growth slowdown and the likelihood  of debt problems. However, these
variables turn out not to be helpful in explaining  the world average growth slowdown
from the 70s to the 90s. That remains a mystery not explained by this paper.
Another way of looking at the development  of debt problems is to look at the
change in growth rates over time. Table 4 shows the change in growth for the 5 country
groups from 1960-75  to 1975-94.  What was the difference in country net worth due to the
low growth rates in 1975-94,  compared to a counterfactual  under which growth remained
constant at the 1960-75 rate? Using (10), I evaluate  the effect of growth on net worth at
the initial debt level in 1975  for the 5 groups.22
Table  4: Effect  of growth  on net worth  and change  in debt,  1975  and 1994
Total  net Total  net  Growth Growth Change  in  Effect  on net
public  public  rate 60-  rate 75-  debt  ratio  worth  of change
debt,  debt,  75  94  75 to 94  in growth  60-75
1975  1994  to 75-94,
evaluated  at
initial  debt  ratio
Highly  indebted  poor  48.3%  94.1%  3.6%  1.8%  45.7%  -24.9%
countries
Not  highly  indebted  poor  27.6%  40.6%  3.7%  4.4%  13.0%  10.2%
countries
Highly  indebted  middle-  26.9%  56.2%  4.9%  3.4%  29.2%  -21.2%
income  countries
Not  highly  indebted  middle  9.1%  24.0%  4.9%  3.4%  14.9%  -7.0%
income  countries
Industrial  countries  29.0%  58.7%  4.5%  2.4%  29.7%  -22.8%
The fall in growth had a large negative effect on government net worth for the highly
indebted poor countries, highly indebted middle income countries, and the industrial
countries.  These were the three groups of countries which had large increases in public
debt ratios (negative net worth accumulation). If growth had stayed at the level it was in
1960-75,  these debt problems  would not have developed in anything like the magnitude
they did.
In contrast, the not highly indebted poor countries actually had an increase in
growth. The not highly indebted middle income countries did have a fall in growth, but it
was not as costly as it was for the highly indebted middle income countries because the
not-highly-indebted  middle income countries had much lower initial public debt ratios in
1975. The highly indebted middle income countries would likely not have developed a23
debt crisis (like that which erupted in Latin America and elsewhere in 1982) if growth
rates at stayed at their 1960-75  levels.
Another way of calibrating the effect of the policy-induced  growth slowdown is to
ask how their debt would have evolved if the primary deficit had remained at the same
level but the growth rate had been at the 1960-75  level. Figure 5 gives the example of
some illustrative country cases, who would have known unchanged or lower debt levels
under the counterfactual that growth had remained at the 1960-75  levels. These 5
examples would not have experienced  debt crises if growth rates at remained at their
1960-75  levels. In general HIPCs', HIMCs', and industrial countries' debt would have
remained at far more manageable levels if 1960-75  growth rates had continued.
Figure  4: Actual  debt  to GDP  ratios  compared  to counterfactual  that
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Application II. Econometric tests of growth effects on debt rescheduling
I can do a more formal econometric test of debt problems with data on external
debt reschedulings. A prediction  of the need for external debt rescheduling  can be given
as the difference between the current value of the primary surplus and that required to
attain public sector solvency  at existing public debt levels.' 4 This is just the
intertemporal  fiscal balance (IFB) given earlier in (6). We can think of an equation that
has
Prob (rescheduling)=f(IFB)
I implement this equation first by regressing the number of debt reschedulings  for
1980-94  on the components  of the IFB: the actual primary surplus, a constant times the
initial D/Y ratio, and growth times the D/Y ratio. I first use as a dependent variable the
number of debt reschedulings over 1980-94,  as given  by the World Bank's World Debt
Tables.'5 Note that these data apply only to developing countries; industrial countries are
excluded from the sample.
I instrument both for the primary surplus and for the growth rate as the amount of
debt rescheduling could have had feedback effects on both variables. Debt difficulties
could inhibit growth (although  I found no evidence  for that earlier), and rescheduling
could have as a condition that the primary surplus  be increased.
My data on the primary surplus is constructed from the IMF's Government
Finance Statistics from data on the overall national government surplus or deficit plus
interest spending. This definition includes aid receipts as revenue. However, there is one
14 Berg and Sachs 1988 take the approach  of relating debt rescheduling  during 1982-87  to country
fundamentals  like inequality,  share of agriculture,  and trade openness. My approach  differs in deriving  the
need for debt rescheduling directly  from the intertemporal  budget constraint.
15  The data on debt reschedulings  is from Bruno and Easterly 199825
element of aid that goes uncounted  in these figures, which is the grant element of
concessional  financing. This has been calculated  for the years 1975-95  by Chang,
Fernandez-Arias,  and Serven 1999.  1 add in their calculation of the grant element as
percent of GDP into the primary surplus. Finally, I calculate seignorage  revenues using
the discrete time approximation  (g+ir)/(l+g+7z)  *HN-Y  where 7i  is the percent inflation
rate, g is the GDP growth rate, and H/Y is the ratio of money base to GDP. The period of
the data (1980-94) is truncated  at the end by the availability  of the fiscal and debt data
and at the beginning by the availability of data on reschedulings.  This period nevertheless
covered the period of the debt crises in both middle income and low income countries; I
will deal with the currency  crises after 1994 below.
There is a problem of simultaneity  about the primary surplus and debt
rescheduling. Highly indebted nations will be forced to run higher primary surpluses  to
keep the debt from exploding (including using the inflation tax and marshalling  more aid
receipts). On the other hand, the debt identity says that countries with a higher primary
surplus are less likely to need rescheduling.
There is also the problem that growth is an endogenous variable, and that debt
crises may have caused low growth rather than the other way around (although again, I
found no evidence for that hypothesis in the earlier regression). To deal with these
simultaneity  problems, I run IV regressions  for both the frequency of debt rescheduling
and the primary surplus. I run both single equation IV and GMM for the system of two
equations. My instruments are initial debt levels, and instruments  for growth interacted
with initial debt -- the growth of trading partners and dummies for Africa and Latin
America. Trading partner growth was heavily dominated  by OECD growth and thus did26
not represent feedback from debt crises to growth. The other variables are also plausibly
exogenous and excludable from the debt rescheduling  equation.16
The regression results are shown in table 3. We see that the regression fails to
confirm a role for the primary surplus in the single equation for debt rescheduling, but the
primary surplus does have a negative  effect on the frequency of rescheduling in the
system estimation. Initial debt increases the frequency  of rescheduling in both methods.
The sign on the GDP growth term interacted with initial debt is negative and significant
in both methods. Growth has a strong role to play in whether a debt crisis develops.
The single equation results on the primary surplus  do not show any association
between debt and actual primary surplus,  but the system estimator does show that
countries with initially large debt run larger primary surpluses.  The dependence of the
primary surplus on the interaction term between growth and debt is insignificant,
although of the predicted negative sign.
16 A test  of the overidentifying  restrictions  for the debt  rescheduling  equation  fails  to reject  the restrictions
by a large margin, confirming that the instruments  are appropriate.27
Table  5: Results  on debt  rescheduling,  fiscal  balance,  and growth  for developing
countries
Dependent  # of debt  Primary  fiscal  # of debt  Primary  fiscal
variable  reschedulings,  surplus/GDP,  reschedulings,  surplus/GDP,
1980-94  1980-94  1980-94  1980-94
Estimation  TSLS  TSLS  GMM,  Equation GMM,  Equation
method  1  2
Coef-  T-  Coef-  T-  Coef-  T-  Coef-  T-
ficient statistic  ficient  statistic ficient statistic ficient  statistic
Constant  2.1  1.87  0.022  2.62  2.8  3.08  0.014  2.21
Primary  fiscal  2.7  0.08  -47.8  -2.02
surplus/GDP,
1980-94
PV  10.4  3.97  0.028  1.59  12.1  6.04  0.042  2.87
Debt/GDP,19
80
Growth8O94* -272.2  -3.60  -0.490  -1.06 -292.1  -6.39 -0.517  -1.36
DebtlGDP
observations  49r___t  49  1  49  _  491
Instruments  for all equations:  PV Debt1GDP  1980,  Trading  partner  growth*PV
Debt/GDP,  Africa  dummy*PV  Debt/GDP,  Latin  America  dummy*PV  Debt/GDP,
Trading  Partner  Growth,  Africa  dummy,  Latin  America  dummy
Application III. Did fiscal adjustment compensate  for the  fall in growth?
We have seen that a worldwide decline in growth contributed  to debt problems in
many countries. But these countries did not stand still. There was a widespread trend
towards fiscal adjustment  over 1975-94.  To what extent did this fiscal adjustment
compensate  for the fall in growth, from the perspective of the intertemporal  fiscal
imbalance?  Table 6 shows that countries  did improve their intertemporal  fiscal imbalance
despite the fall in growth from 1975 to 1994.  To implement this exercise, I perform the
following steps. For the industrial  countries, I derive the permanent component of the
primary surplus by doing the standard cyclical adjustment of the deficit, applying  the
Hodrik-Prescott  filter to isolate the cyclical components of GDP and of the primary28
surplus to GDP ratio. I then remove the portion of the primary surplus to GDP ratio
correlated with the GDP cycle, to yield the cyclically  adjusted primary surplus. As for the
developing country groups, they display no evidence of cyclicality  in their primary
balances, so I simply apply the Hodrik-Prescott  filter directdy  to their primary balance to
GDP ratios. To define the intertemporal  fiscal imbalance in 1975, I substitute the growth
for 1960-75  and the permanent  component of the primary surplus and public debt ratio in
1975  into equation (6).  This gives the counterfactual  of what was the imbalance in 1975
under the assumption  that 1960-75  growth rates would continue. In 1994, I use the 1975-
94 growth rate, the 1994  public debt to GDP ratio, and the permanent  component of the
primary surplus in 1994. This whole exercise should be taken with a grain of salt
because of the small sample sizes available with the fiscal data (6-12 HIPCs, 5-7 non-
HIPC low income, 9-15 highly indebted middle income, 8-13 lightly indebted middle
income, and 15-21 industrial countries).29
Table  6: Intertemporal  fiscal  imbalances,  1975  and 1994
Growth  Growth  Primary  Primary  Inter-  Inter-
rate  60-  rate  75-  surplus/  surplus/  temporal  temporal
75  94  GDP,  1975  GDP,  1994  fiscal  fiscal
(permanent (permanent imbalance/  imbalance/
component) component) GDP,  1975 GDP,  1994
Highly  3.6%  1.8%  -0.5%  4.3%  -1.6%  0.4%
indebted  poor
countries
Not  highly  3.7%  4.4%  -1.6%  4.1%  -2.3%  3.4%
indebted  poor
countries










Industrial  4.5%  2.4%  -2.2%  0.2%  -2.7%  -2.0%
countries
World  real interest  rate is calculated  at 6%  for 1978-94  (LIBOR-Dollar  Inflation)
All country groups improved their intertemporal  fiscal imbalances from 1975 to
1994, despite the fall in growth. However, the fall in growth and rise in public debt ratios
meant that the change in the intertemporal  fiscal imbalance was much less than the
improvement  in their primary surpluses. The HIPCs, for example,  improved their
primary surplus by nearly 5 percentage points of GDP, but their intertemporal  fiscal
imbalance improved by only 2 percentage points of GDP. The highly indebted RICH30
countries improved  their primary surplus by 2.4 percentage  points of GDP, but their
intertemporal  fiscal balance improved  by only 0.7 percentage points. In fact, the
industrial country scofflaws  were the only country group that still had a negative IFB in
1994.  Some industrial countries have made further fiscal adjustments since 1994 (for
example  the Euro countries that had to observe a fiscal deficit target in 1997 under the
Maastricht Treaty), but still not enough to reverse the negative IFB. This does not even
take into account the large net pension liabilities  in industrial countries (a mean of 95
percent of 1994 GDP for 20 OECD countries according to Roseveare et al. 1996),  which
are worse than in developing countries because of aging populations in OECD countries.
If we included the net pension liabilities in 1994  public debt, the industrial countries
would have an intertemporal  fiscal imbalance of 5.5 percentage  points of GDP. They
need to make a permanent fiscal adjustment  of this amount to attain solvency. This
suggests  that industrial countries are in the worse shape fiscally - from the intertemporal
point of view -- of any of the country groups shown here. The worst five when both
public debt and net pension liabilities are included are Sweden, Denmark, Canada,
Belgium, and Italy, all with intertemporal  fiscal imbalances  at over 6 percent of GDP.
The latest calculation on the US shows an intertemporal  fiscal imbalance of 1.3 percent
of GDP, despite all the talk about budget surpluses (Auerbach  and Gale 2000). Those
country groups fiscally better off than the rich countries includes even the HIPCs -
perhaps we now need a Highly Indebted Rich Countries (HIRC)  debt forgiveness
program.
Before we get too excited  about the fiscal virtue of the HIPC countries, however,
we should look at how they achieved  the healthy primary surplus/GDP  ratios by 199431
that they did. If we exclude aid flows (including  both grants and the grant component of
concessionary financing), then the primary surplus  improved only 1 percent of GDP from
1975  to 1994, which was not enough to prevent the worsening of the intertemporal fiscal
imbalance excluding aid (Table 7). So it was increased aid flows that accounted  for most
of the HIPCs' fiscal improvement  from 1975-94. Even the small amount of fiscal
adjustment the HIPCs did turns out to be due to increased seignorage  revenue, which may
not be the most desirable kind of fiscal adjustment.  Excluding both aid and seignorage
revenue, the HIPCs' primary deficit to GDP ratio did not improve at all over 1975-94
(Table 7), which meant their intertemporal  fiscal imbalance worsened.  The HIPC debt
initiative may reflect aid-weariness  by the major donors, and the desire to substitute debt
forgiveness for continuing heavy aid flows.
Table  7: Highly  indebted  poor  Primary  surplus/  GDP,  Intertemporal  fiscal
countries'  decomposition  of fiscal  (permanent  component)  imbalance/  GDP
adjustment
1975  1994  1975  1994
Including  aid  and inflation  tax  -0.5%  4.3%  -1.6%  0.4%
Excluding  aid  but including  inflation  -3.2%  -2.2%  -4.4%  -6.2%
tax  _  _  _  _
Excluding  aid, excluding  inflation  tax  -4.1%  -4.1%  -5.3%  -8.1%
When trouble arises & things look bad, there is always one
individual  who perceives a solution & is willing to take command
Very often, that person is crazy.
--Saying passed along by my Aunt Marilyn
3. Conclusions
This paper offers a fresh perspective on debt crises from the point of view of
growth slowdowns' effect on fiscal solvency.  This is not to say that growth slowdowns
are the only cause of debt crises, or that raising growth is an easy panacea for escaping32
them. The usual suspects of exchange rate and macroeconomic  mismanagement  are still
relevant, but should be viewed in a more comprehensive  framework  through fiscal
solvency accounting.
The growth slowdown in 1975-94  compared to 1960-75 helps explain the debt
burden problems in the Highly Indebted Poor Countries  (HIPCs), highly indebted middle
income countries, and the industrial countries.  The slower growth of HIPCs compared to
other low income countries over 1960-75  is explained  by about 2 percentage  points of
GDP less spent on transport and communications,  more overvalued currencies in the 80s
and 90s, lower primary and secondary  enrollments,  and lower M2/GDP. If we take the
effects of these policies on growth as causal, the HIPCs could have largely avoided their
debt burden problems  by choosing better policies. I can econometrically  explain the
frequency of debt rescheduling over 1980-94  with the primary surplus and with growth
interacted with initial debt, instrumenting  for the primary surplus and for growth.
Nevertheless,  all groups of countries except industrial countries had attained fiscal
solvency  through large changes in their primary budget balances by 1994.
The reason for the growth slowdown  is left unexplained.  One conceivable
explanation is that governments shifted toward greater impatience  in the second half of
the period, both fostering less growth and tolerating higher debt to GDP ratios. However,
I failed to find any cross-section  correlation between high debt and slow growth, which
one would have expected if this story held.
In any case, for individual  countries that can affect their growth rate through
country policies, growth-enhancing  measures are the best kind of fiscal policy to confront
a debt crisis.33
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